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I. INTRODUCTION
The change of fortunes in the 2006 congressional elections appears, at
first blush, a refutation of mounting concerns over the lack of
competitiveness in districted elections in the United States. As the election
approached, all the elements of an upsurge in seats held by the out-of-power
Democrats seemed in place. The 2006 congressional elections occurred
against a backdrop of a thin majority in the House, an off-year election with a
President with historically low levels of popular support, a protracted and
increasingly unpopular war, a difficult economic setting with highly visible
spikes in oil prices, and-in short-the traditional hallmarks of changing
partisan fortunes in the House.
Our aim in this Article is to urge a bit of caution before concluding that
the system worked just as it should have and that our elections continue to
properly ensure accountability of the elected to the electors. Even
uncompetitive districts are at some level subject to shifts in voter preference.
A district that is designed to be a safe district for an incumbent with 80% of
the population of the incumbent's party could be won by the opposing party
were that party to receive 100% of the votes. Indeed, so long as there are
elections, the voters can always override the designed outcomes. The
question is the degree of difficulty faced by the party out-of-power in
translating shifts in voter sympathies into actual changes in electoral
fortunes. The issue for us is not whether at some extraordinary level of voter
dissatisfaction incumbents can be displaced, but what are the obstacles that
the party out-of-power must overcome, and how do those compare to the
past. Our focus is on the House elections and how the hurdles faced by the
out-of-power Democrats in 2006 compare to those faced by the party out-of-
power in the post-World War II era.
Of course, no one doubts that incumbency has its rewards. Name-
recognition, franked communications, gerrymandered districts, and
privileged access to fund-raising all seem to help provide sinecure for our
elected representatives. Yet, seemingly, if history is a guide, then the
Democratic capture of control of the House in 2006 should have been ripe for
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the picking. Our aim in this paper is to provide some empirical support for
the proposition that the perfection of gerrymandering has provided to the
incumbent officeholders an insulation from popular swings in approval or
disapproval that makes it more difficult for any party to pick up seats, the
opposition party clearly included. Obviously, our claim is not that a change
of power cannot happen, only that it takes historic shifts in voter preferences
for it to occur. In order to make this point, we examine how difficult it has
been in the post-World War II era for the minority party to pick up the most
vulnerable seats of the controlling party. Put most simply, we show that the
Democratic Party gain of a majority of the seats in the House required an
extraordinarily large shift in voter sentiment, particularly when one considers
that the Democrats entered the elections facing a Republican majority of only
fifteen seats.
To make this point we develop a congressional hazard model to test the
responsiveness of Congress as an institution to shifts in popular electoral
preferences. The key to this model, what we term an "insulation index," is to
examine the marginal districts held by the incumbent party to determine how
large a switch in votes is necessary for control of those districts to change.
We use the data from all elections since 1946 to assess historical trends and
to compare the relative level of insulation of the current Congress against
historical backdrops. What our analysis will show is that, despite relative
overall national parity between the parties in the post-War period, the
districts held by each party tend to be more firmly in their control than ever
before. For example, the five most vulnerable seats held by the national
majority party would have changed hands with only on average a 1.5% swing
in each of the districts between 1946 and 2002. By contrast, it would have
taken a swing of 3.3% of the two-party vote to change the five most
vulnerable seats held by the Republicans after the 2004 elections into
Democratic seats.
The insulation index is designed to measure the vulnerability of the
marginal seats to a shift in voter preference. Thus, historically in the post-
War period, a 1.5% increase in the minority party's share of the two-party
vote in the most vulnerable districts would have yielded five additional seats.
In 2004, such a change in the minority party's vote-share would have fallen
far short of the shift in voter behavior needed to pick up five additional seats
in Congress. To the extent that the incumbent party has a greater cushion
from shifts in popular opinion translating into lost seats, we measure that
party as enjoying greater insulation from electoral preferences.
Our presentation will proceed in two parts. In the first instance, we will
present data, mostly not original to us, to show the general trend toward
incumbent entrenchment through the redistricting process. These are largely
data drawn at the national level, with a few state overviews added, to show
the general picture of diminishing competition for congressional office and
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the particular effect of redistricting in compounding the loss of electoral
competition. The second part of the paper looks to district-specific election
returns to measure the likelihood that shifts in voter preferences will actually
yield changes in the composition of Congress. This is the original part of the
paper in measuring (to our knowledge, for the first time) the likely effects of
different levels of changes in voter preferences to electoral outcomes. Our
conclusion emerges from these data and serves to corroborate the intuition
that redistricting, as currently practiced, compounds the agency problem of
Congress as an institution being increasingly insulated from the actual
preferences of voters. 1
II. THE IMPACT OF REDISTRICTING
Oddly, the debates on gerrymandering have started to have the feel of
debates on global warming. The electoral world appears less competitive,
much as each successive summer feels unusually warm. But in complex
systems with many confounding variables, who can be sure of the cause? 2
Perhaps redistricting has not attracted its Michael Crichton to weigh in
among the nay-sayers, but something seems to have happened to make
competitive congressional elections appear even more endangered than the
polar ice caps.
So, we begin from the foundations of a claim that redistricting is at least
correlated with a decline in competitiveness-certainly not an intended effect
of the reapportionment revolution of the 1960s. The following figure,
produced by Sam Hirsch, gives a sense of the distinct feature of the post-
2000 redistricting relative to the three other redistrictings following the one-
person, one-vote cases of the 1960s.3
I For the purposes of this paper, we focus on what is known as "swing ratio," rather
than "partisan bias"-two different characteristics of what is known as the "seats-votes
curve." We do not consider here whether the insulation effect we present helps one party
or another, or the sources of that bias. For a discussion of that matter, see Bernard
Grofman, William Koetzle & Thomas Brunell, An Integrated Perspective on the Three
Potential Sources of Partisan Bias: Malapportionment, Turnout Differences, and the
Geographic Distribution of Party Vote-Shares, 16 ELECTORAL STUD. 457 (1997).
2 There has long been a suggestion in the academic literature that the "optimal
partisan" gerrymander differs from the "classic" gerrymander when parties are concerned
about the long-term risk of electoral defeat. To the extent that some gerrymanders
represent such risk-minimizations and others do not, the waters are muddied. Still, the
general trend is impossible to ignore. See Guillermo Owen & Bernard Grofman, Optimal
Partisan Gerrymandering, 7 POL. GEOGRAPHY Q. 5 (1988).
3 These data are from Sam Hirsch, The United States House of Unrepresentatives:
What Went Wrong in the Latest Round of Congressional Redistricting, 2 ELECTION L.J.
183 (2003).
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Figure 1-Rate of Incumbent Congressional Re-Election (1972-2002)
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These data show a generally high rate of incumbent congressional re-
election, with 95% of incumbents successfully retaining their seats. In the
three post-reapportionment elections after Baker4 and Reynolds,5 however,
that figure dropped to 91%, exactly what would be hoped for if redistricting
served to shuffle the deck and allow for new challenges to emerge. In 2002,
by contrast, the retention rate actually rose to 96% following redistricting-a
significant reversal, even if the pool of observation is quite shallow.
The aberrant feature of post-2000 redistricting is all the more striking in
light of the persistent decline in the overall competitiveness of congressional
elections. Figure 2 shows the cyclical decline in districts in which the major
party candidates are separated by five or ten percentage points or less (e.g.,
closer than or equal to 52.5% vs. 47.5% or 55% vs. 45%). The number of
such races has declined markedly over time, although in years of major voter
shifts, the number of competitive districts has restored somewhat. Prior to the
2000 round of redistricting, the decennial reapportionment typically restored
some measure of competitiveness. Thus, whereas the 1992 redistricting
opened up the anticipated competitiveness of the field, as reflected in Figure
2, the 2002 redistricting correlated with a reduced number of districts in play
relative to 2000, and an increase in the number of "safe" districts to an
historical high.
4 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
5 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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Figure 2-Number of Competitive Congressional Races (1946-2004)
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Figure 2 shows the total number of congressional races in each year
decided by 5% or less, and the number decided by 10% or less. The dotted
line is the number decided by 10% or less and the solid is 5% or less. In
terms of total number of competitive races, whether defined as races decided
by five points or less or a less competitive ten points or less, there has been
an evident cyclical decline over the post-War period. Keep in mind that this
figure depicts the total number of congressional seats decided by these
margins, not percentages of congressional races. Whereas there is a mild
uptick in competitive elections after each post-Census redistricting, the
pattern after the 2000 Census is decidedly in the opposite direction. By the
time we get to 2004, there are at most twenty-one seats that are competitive,
even using a liberal definition of competitiveness.
Looking within individual states can at least raise the inference that the
way in which redistricting is conducted contributes to the currently depressed
levels of congressional competition. A contrast of Arkansas and Iowa
provides a useful illustration. Following the post-2000 redistricting, not only
did the margins of incumbent advantage increase in Arkansas, but the
number of congressional races with both major parties running decreased. In
other words, the effect of the redistricting was to put a number of districts
sufficiently out of competition so as to dissuade any effort by the party out-
of-power to even challenge the incumbent. By contrast, in Iowa, redistricting
had no effect on the number of seats contested and brought down the average
margin of victory in the five congressional districts. Unlike Arkansas and
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most states, Iowa uses an independent commission to redistrict, rather than
rely on political insiders.
Figure 3-Races with Both Main Parties in Arkansas and Iowa
Arkansas Iowa
100%80% 1
40%-
20%-
0%-
Percent of Races
with Both Main
Parties
1 2000
EJ 2002
100%-
80%-
60%-
40%-
20%-
0%_
Percent of Races with
Both Main Parties
Figure 4-Margin of Victory in Contested Congressional Races
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Beyond the scope of this paper, but nonetheless interesting, is the
correlation between the lack of competitive elections and the polarization of
Congress. The effect of single-party control of a congressional district is to
transform a two-stage equilibrium into a one-stage game. In simple terms,
because of the need to appeal to the median voter, candidates tend to position
themselves as close to the center of the electorate as they credibly can. This
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is the basic insight about first-past-the-post elections taken from the work of
Hotelling, 6 Downs,7 Duverger,8 and many others. The parties do not simply
collapse into the middle, however, because of the two-stage feature of
American elections, as identified by Aldrich9 and others. Thus, as the
familiar refrain goes, Republicans run to the right in the primaries,
Democrats to the left, and then both try to converge on the center for the
general election. The effect of a district dominated by a single party, either
because there is no real competition or because the other party does not even
try to field a credible and resourced candidate, is to eliminate the second
stage of the equilibrium.
III. THE INSULATED CONGRESS
We now turn to the effect that the drop in competition has had on the
responsiveness of Congress as an institution to American voter preferences.
Our inquiry here is to ask how likely is a change in voter preferences away
from the majority party to result in the minority party gaining seats or even
taking control of the Congress. In the first instance, of course, the likelihood
of taking power depends on who gets the votes. Regardless of how insulated
the Congress might be, a party with 40% of the vote nationally should not
readily be expected to take control of Congress if it increased its national
share to 42% or even 45%. It is instructive to note here, however, just how
close the margins between the two major parties have been in the post-War
period.
6 See Harold Hotelling, Stability in Competition, 39 ECON. J. 41, 54-55 (1929).
7 See ANTHONY DOWNs, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 94-98, 100-102
(1957).
8 See MAURICE DUVERGER, POLITICAL PARTIES: THEIR ORGANIZATION AND
ACTIVITY IN THE MODERN STATE (Barbara North & North, trans., Wiley & Sons 2d ed.
1959).
9 See JOHN H. ALDRICH, WHY PARTIES? THE ORIGINS AND TRANSFORMATIONS OF
POLITICAL PARTIES IN AMERICA 25, 56-57 (1995).
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Figure 5-Republican and Democratic Congressional Vote-Share,
(1946-2004)
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Figure 5 shows the share of the two-party vote won by each of the major
parties from 1946 to 2004, measured as a percentage of aggregate
congressional vote. Despite the major realignments that have occurred since
World War II, especially the realignment of the South away from Democratic
hegemony, the share of the national vote has been remarkably stable. Except
for a couple of blips around the Johnson landslide of 1964 and the fallout
from Watergate, the parties have remained within shouting distance of each
other throughout this period. Even the ballooning of Democratic support
following the Goldwater candidacy and the Nixon resignation quickly
flattened out. Thus, in the first instance, we would expect as a result of the
closeness of overall voter preferences for the two major parties-depending
on national distribution of voter support-that swings in voter preferences
should result in some changes in the size of the majority party's advantage in
seats.
Second, much depends on the size of voter swings from year to year. The
vulnerability of a congressional majority should depend not only on how
close the parties are overall, but on the size of yearly voter swings. Figure 6
shows the swing in aggregate vote-share between the parties from one
election to the next from 1946 to 2004. What we find is that on average the
voter swings in the post-War period seem to be sufficient to reach the spread
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between the parties. Certainly in years of significant dissatisfaction with one
of the parties, swings can reach above 5%, well above the thin margins that
separate the parties at present.
Figure 6-Election Year Vote-Share Swing (1946-2004)
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The heart of our analysis is presented in the figures that follow. We
determine the hypothetical seat gains for different swings in vote-shares by
taking each congressional district, removing the actual aggregate vote-swing
for that election, and incrementally adding vote-share to the minority party.
After each value of vote-increment, we examine whether or not the minority
party would win each district and determine the swing in vote-share required
to produce different levels of shifts in seats. For instance, we report the
aggregate vote shift needed to give the minority party an additional five
seats, ten seats, and so on. The data unmistakably show a shoring up of
support for the most marginal districts in the wake of the 2002
reapportionment and redistricting. The clearest indication is that between
1946 and 1998 the party out-of-power would have required an average gain
of 1.5% of the vote to pick up five additional seats and 2.3% to pick up an
additional ten seats. These are thin margins corresponding to the presence of
competitive districts. By contrast, in 2004, the Democrats would have needed
to pick up 4.9% to gain five seats and 5.7% to pick up ten seats. Even in
watershed years in which one party surged in popular support at the expense
of the other (1946, 1964 and 1994, for example), the buffer in the most at-
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risk districts was decidedly thinner. The summary totals for all elections
since 1946 are presented in the Appendix. Figure 7 gives the overview of the
expanding margins in the most at-risk seats, reflecting the insulation of
incumbent power from electoral challenge.
Figure 7-Expanding Margins in At-Risk Seats
30
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We recognize that this chart is not necessarily self-defining. We have
taken the average of races for every decade from the 1940s through the
1990s, though the last column represents only the year 2004, and the 1940s
column represents only the post-War elections. We have depicted the
competitiveness of the districts on a color spectrum running from white to
black. The purest white indicates seats that have less than a roughly 2%
margin1° separating the incumbent from the loser in the last election,
meaning a pickup of one percentage point would tip the election. The seats
turn dark grey at the 5% margin, when the incumbent won by more than ten
percentage points. The vertical axis represents the first five most vulnerable
seats in the hands of the party controlling Congress, followed by the next
five, and rising to the level of competitiveness at the thirtieth seat. Allowing
black to generally stand for well insulated seats, what one finds is that
historically the black shading does not emerge until the thirty seat level, if at
all. By contrast, in 2004, the black shading begins even at the most marginal
of the incumbent party's seats.
10 The actual margin for white is less than 2.0775%.
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In our view, this chart provides a visual confirmation of the loss of
accountability of Congress to shifts in voter preferences. It is not that the
party out of power cannot gain control of Congress. That ultimately is a
product of how the votes are cast. Were the Democrats to win 100% of the
vote, to take the absurd extreme, they would of course recapture the
Congress-and in its entirety to boot. Rather, the insulation effect is felt in
the real world in which swings in voter preferences generally stay below the
5% level in all but the most extraordinary election years. Yet the effect of the
redistricting insulation is to require a mobilization of voters at what are, in
effect, historic high water marks in order to shake things up in Congress. Our
claim is not that this is impossible, just that the power of the gerrymander has
been used to build up the electoral flood walls so that only a significant storm
surge of popular opinion can have any discernible effect.
IV. LIMITATIONS, METHODOLOGICAL AND OTHERWISE
At some point in all elections, either a party commands enough votes to
win power, or it does not. Absent outright fraud, there is invariably a limit to
how much voting power may be enhanced beyond what the raw votes will
allow. And so too is there a limit to what can be gotten by shoring up
potentially marginal districts against partisan challenge, what we consider to
be the paradoxical consequence of the insulation effect. Somehow or other,
the party in power can only make do with the actual number of votes it
receives. The protection of all incumbents requires a redistribution of voters
in such a way that the percentage of safe votes is decreased in other districts.
This is a simple matter of arithmetic. To add votes to marginal seats, the
votes have to come from somewhere, assuming no overall increase in support
for the party in power. Thus, it is interesting to compare the margins in 2004
to those in 1966 and 1980, two years that had roughly comparable disparities
between the shares of the overall two-party vote garnered by the parties.
Our initial focus was on the effect of gerrymandering. In 2004, it would
have taken a 6.0% shift in the two-party vote towards the Democrats for
them to win the closest fifteen seats. In 1966, a shift of only 3.1% would
have given the minority party an additional fifteen seats, and in 1980, a shift
of only 2.2% in the two-party vote would have been required for the minority
party to pick up fifteen seats.
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Figure 8--Vote Percentage Gain v. Seat Gain in 1966, 1980 and 2004
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This means that even with the same vote distributions between majority and
minority party, the burden on the minority party to pick up an additional
fifteen seats is much greater in 2004. The secondary effect is also significant.
Our model would predict that if the out-party (the Democrats) were to pick
up 6%, the result in 2006 would be a switch in partisan control of the House.
By contrast, a 6% swing in the two-party vote in 1966 resulted in a
Republican gain of forty-seven seats, but it was not enough to give them
control of the House. In 1980, a 6.1% increase in the share of the Republican
vote would have given them an additional forty-four seats. The effect of
gerrymandering districts is not to raise the burden of picking up any new
seats, but to increase the likelihood that the effect of a significant upswing in
support, should such an upswing occur, will be a tidal surge in congressional
seats gained.
It is possible to capture the effects by comparing the seats and votes
swing effect for two years: 1980 and 2004. In Figure 9 we show how total
seats in 1980 would have changed corresponding to hypothetical vote
changes ranging from 0 to 30%. We see a fairly smooth line-each share of
aggregate vote picked up by the minority party would have been predictably
translated to additional seats in an almost linear fashion. In the same Figure,
we show the relationship between seats and votes predicted for 2004. Here
we see a different shape to the distribution: small changes in the aggregate
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vote-share would have produced almost no changes in the distribution of
seats. However, once the change in vote-shares reaches 6% we see a very
steep rise in the relationship between votes and seats that does not taper off
until beyond the 350 seat mark. This S-shaped curve is what we would
expect from the decreasing number of close districts, and the corresponding
increase in safe incumbent districts. The curve accurately reflects the
difficulty of getting over the insulation hurdle. Once over the hurdle,
however, the gains are swift and the plateau is reached more quickly.
Imagine the limiting case of this: consider a world where all districts have a
normal vote of either 60% majority party or 60% minority party. The only
way the minority party would pick up votes is if it went from 40% of the vote
to 60% of the vote in districts held by the majority party. A swing of 20% of
the vote seems unlikely. But were it to occur, the minority party would sit on
a knife-edge situation where a 19% swing could give it no additional seats,
and a 21% swing could give it over 200 additional seats.
Figure 9-Total Seats Gained v.
1980 v. 2004
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A more difficult challenge is presented by the untested assumption in our
data that national voter trends translate into comparable swings in the
marginal districts. There is no reason in principle why, for example, a
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Democratic pickup of 1% nationally could not be surgically confined to
Republican at-risk districts. For now, this assumption remains to be tested.
However, corroboration of our estimates can be found by comparing the
predicted seat gain from the voting patterns in any year in which the minority
party gains votes to the actual number of seats the minority party gained. If
the minority party's gains translate into seats at the rate predicted by
assuming a uniform vote swing across districts, this would be confirmation
that our assumption is benign. The predicted and actual seat shares are
correlated at .99 for the period from 1952 to 2004. Thus, our uniform swing
assumption does not seem to lead us astray in making predictions about the
impact of swings in the aggregate vote-share on party shares of actual seats.
Table 1 lists the predicted and actual values of seats won in those years in
which the minority party gained votes.
Table 1-Minority Seats Won: Predicted v. Actual
Predicted
Aggregate Minority Minority Seats
Year Swing Seats Actually Won
1946 6.4 239 246
1948 7.9 254 263
1950 3.2 191 199
1954 2.6 227 232
1956 1.6 201 201
1960 1.2 174 174
1966 6.0 187 187
1968 0.4 192 192
1976 1.3 141 143
1978 2.7 153 158
1980 3.2 186 192
1984 3.5 176 182
1988 1 168 175
1994 6.3 233 230
1996 3.4 210 207
2004 0.7 202 202
Correlation: 0.99
For most years, our methodology predicts fairly well the actual result of
a pick-up in votes by the party out-of-power. There is little reason to think
that, across the broad spectrum of the electorate, rising tides do not lift all
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boats, both in districts held firmly by the party in power and in the contested
districts as well.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper relies on a straightforward presentation of election data over
the past sixty years. We make no grand assumptions in our analysis. Our
conclusion is that the decrease in contested elections has the effect of
insulating incumbent officeholders from changes in voter preferences. The
effect we identify does not mean that officeholders are invulnerable to any
changes in voter preferences. Thus, the Democratic sweep in the 2006
congressional elections, with aggregate vote-share swings at historic high
water marks of about 7%, had the effect of shifting control of Congress.
Rather, our claim is only that gerrymandering has contributed to making this
more difficult as more traditional swings in voter preference would likely
have little or no effect on the partisan composition of the House. Our further
conclusion is that, to the extent that elected officials are insulated from
accountability by more robust electoral margins, the agency costs grow. By
any reasonable measure, agents who have less to fear from oversight will act
in their own interests and will feel freer to disregard the will of their
principals. That too is a cost of having increasingly insulated elected
representatives. An insulated Congress is one that becomes increasingly
inattentive to the preferences of the electorate. The fact that it requires a shift
in voter sentiment of historic proportions to cause a small change in partisan
distribution of House seats shows how far we have strayed from the simple
idea that elections are supposed to provide a check on the government by
offering a meaningful threat to remove legislators from office in ordinary,
not just extraordinary, times.
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